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SUPPLEMENTAL

BRIEF

Respondent submits this
to Rule 25.5 of this Court.

FOR RESPONDENT

supplemental

brief

pursuant

Under the unique circumstances of this case, the brief
for the United States constitutes "intervening matter that
was not available in time to be included in a brief." A
majority of the government’s argument consists
of an
attack on the literal reading of section 704(a) advanced
respondent. 1 If this Court were to adopt the government’s
narrow reading of section 704(a), it is far from certain that
respondent would prevail. The original panel of the Sixth
Circuit that heard this case applied a version of the
"materially
adverse" formulation
now advanced by the
United States and concluded that the retaliation
that
occurred in this case was lawful under section 704(a). (Pet.
App. 93a-103a). The interpretation
of section 704(a)
proposed by the Solicitor General is different from that of
petitioner,
and constitutes
a candid repudiation of the
position heretofore taken by the EEOC. (U.S. Br. 15-16
n.4). The new matters raised by the government’s brief
could not have been addressed in the brief for respondent;
the two briefs were filed on the same day.

1 Compare
R. Br. 8-28with U.S. Br. 9-20.

2
ARGUMENT
I.

THE GOVERNMENT’S INTERPRETATION
OF
SECTION 704(a)
IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE
TEXT AND PURPOSE OF THAT PROVISION

A substantial portion of the government’s argument is
devoted to three inter-related
propositions: that section
704(a) forbids only the types of actions forbidden
section 703, that section 703 is limited to discrimination in
the terms and conditions of employment, and that section
704(a) does not forbid retaliation
outside the employeremployee relationship.
(U.S. Br. 9-20). These contentions
are squarely inconsistent with the position taken by the
United States in this Court in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
519 U.S. 337 (1997).
In Robinson, the court of appeals had held that section
704(a) does not forbid retaliation
against former employees; the lower court reasoned that section 704(a) forbids
only the types of employment practices covered by section
703(a), and thus was limited to retaliation
occurring when
the victim was still an employee. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
70 F.3d 325, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1995). 2 The United States,
urging this Court to reverse the decision of the circuit

It is unclear whether, or to what extent, the United States now
believes that Robinson should be overruled. In some passages, the
government asserts that section 704(a) does not apply to retaliation
"outside of the employment relationship."
(U.S. Br. 19). That would
seem to mean that retaliation
against a former employee - one who no
longer has such a relationship
with the employer - would always be
lawful. Elsewhere, the United States states more ambiguously that the
retaliation
need only be "employment-related conduct." (U.S. Br. 18).
That might apply to some types of retaliation
against a former employee (e.g., if it prevented the victim from obtaining employment with
another employer) but not to others (e.g., a harassing lawsuit).

3
court, correctly objected that this line of reasoning misconstrued the relationship between sections 704(a) and 703.
That analysis reflects a misunderstanding of Title VII in several respects. It overlooks important
differences between Section 703 and Section 704
of Title VII. Section 703(a) declares it to be
"unlawful employment practice" to violate Title
VII’s substantive prohibition against discrimination with respect to certain specified actions by
employers, all of which are related to employment. Section 704(a) provides that it shall also
an "unlawful employment practice" to discriminate against a covered individual
"because he
has made a charge" under Title VII. Violations of
Section 704(a) are not limited to the "unlawful
employment practice[s]" listed in Section 703(a).
Rather, Section 704(a) "speaks unconditionally,
without limitation
to acts causing particular
harms .... " Smith v. Secretary of the Navy, 659
3F.2d 113, 119 n.56 (D.C.Cir. 1981).
The United States made the same point at oral argument.
"[Section] 704, unlike 703, doesn’t say discrimination in
the terms, conditions or privileges of employment. It just
"~
says discrimination.
The government does not explain how even its new
reading of the relationship between sections 704(a) and 703
3 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., No. 95-1376, Brief for the United States
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner,
22-23 (footnote omitted). That footnote read
part, "The unconditional nature of Section 704(a) reflects
its broad
purpose of ensuring the effectiveness of the prohibitions on employment
discrimination." Id. at 23 n.12.
’ Transcript
656475 *22.

of Oral Argument, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 1996 WL

4
supports its suggestion that section 704(a) applies only
retaliation
constituting a "materially adverse employment
action." Even under section 703(a)(1) any work assignment,
employer-imposed working condition, or benefit is a "ter[m],
conditio[n]
or privileg[e]
of employment." The phrase
"materially adverse" is nowhere to be found in the government’s eleven page discussion of the connection between section 704(a) and 703. (U.S. Br. 9-20).
This phrase first makes its appearance at page 21 of
the brief for the United States. There the government
asserts (correctly in our view) that to establish a prima
facie case under section 704(a) a plaintiff must show that
"5
he or she has suffered an "adverse employment action.
The United States then observes that a number of courts
of appeals have "held that an employee must show a
materially adverse change in the terms, conditions,
or
privileges
of employment to satisfy the adverse action
element of the prima facie case." (U.S. Br. 21) (emphasis
added). This sentence is somewhat perplexing. The whole
thrust of the government’s brief is to urge this Court to
hold that the complained of retaliation
cannot merely be
"adverse," it must be =materially adverse." (Although the
matter is not free from doubt, we take it that the government uses the term "materially" in its ordinary meaning of
"to a significant extent or degree. ~) If ~materially adverse"
requires
injury or change more serious than what is

That is consistent with our proposed literal
reading of section
704(a), which requires discrimination "against" the plaintiff. That is the
meaning of "adverse"
in ordinary
English.
Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary, 31 (1981) (defining "adverse" as "in opposition
to one’s interests," "unfavorable," "detrimental").
Webster’s Third NewInternational Dictionary, 1392 (1981).

5
merely "adverse," it makes no sense to assert that only
proof of "materially adverse" action will "satisfy" the
requirement of "adverse" action.
This additional requirement of "material" adversity
would be unwarranted even in an action under section
703. Section 703(a)(2) forbids an employer, inter alia,
to limit ... his employees . .. in any way which
would ... adversely affect his status as an eraployee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)
(emphasis added). When
gress chose to use the term "adverse" in Title VII, 7 it
emphatically did not include the additional requirement
that the discriminatory
action be "materially"
adverse.
That choice is assuredly a deliberate one; the term "adverse" is used more than 1300 times in the United States
Code, but the more limited phrase "materially adverse" is
8utilized in only seven federal statutes.
The government acknowledges that its reading of
section 704(a) would in some circumstances
permit
employer to engage in retaliatory
actions that "would
deter employees from charging discrimination."
(U.S. Br.
19). On the government’s view, any objection
that an
employer would thus be able - by using properly crafted
retaliatory
techniques - to prevent workers from complaining to the EEOC,testifying at trial, or objecting to
sexual harassment, is "tantamount to a policy objection to
7 The term adverse, not modified by ~materially,"

is also in section

703(c)(2).
8 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 702; 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843, 1844; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78q,
78eee; 16 U.S.C. § 6205.

6
the line drawn by Congress." (U.S. Br. 20). But in its brief
in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., the United States saw no
such line limiting the reach of the section 704(a) ban
retaliation,
which the Solicitor General correctly characterized as "unconditional."
At a minimumthe statute is ambiguous .... [I]n
construing a statute,
the Court should adopt
that sense of its words which best promotes the
policy and objectives of the legislature. [King v.]
St. Vincent’s Hospital,
[502 U.S. 215,] 221
[(1991)] .... Strong protection from retaliation
toward employees who complain to, or cooperate
with the EEOCis essential to the effectiveness of
Title VII .... 9
As the government correctly recognized in this earlier
brief, the policy of protecting employees from retaliation all retaliation - is the policy of the Congress itself.
II.

THE GOVERNMENT’S
PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 704(a)
FAILS TO
PROVIDE
A CLEAR AND PREDICTABLE
STANDARD FOR THE LOWER COURTS

The government suggests its proposed interpretation
of section 704(a) will provide the lower courts with
workable, objective, and uniform standard." (U.S. Br. 20).
To the contrary,
far from being workable, objective or
uniform, what the government proposes is hardly a standard at all.

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., No. 95-1376, Brief for the United States
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, 16.

7
The government offers three quite different characterizations of its proposal. First, it asserts that a plaintiff
must show that the retaliatory
act resulted in a "materially significant disadvantage." (U.S. Br. 22). This seems
congruent with the phrase "materially
adverse." Since
both "materially" and %ignificant" mean "important," this
formulation
requires
something like a very important
disadvantage.
Paying someone less because she complained about sexual harassment would be a disadvantage
(or adverse); a pay cut of $100 a week might be materially
adverse, but a smaller pay cut (say, $10) might not.
retaliatory
transfer to a more distant office might be
materially significant (at a distance of perhaps 50 miles),
materially adverse (perhaps 25 miles) or small enough
be legal (possibly at 10 miles). To apply this type of standard, the lower courts would have to develop some sort of
rating system to evaluate the comparative disadvantageousness of different acts of retaliation.
Howadverse a
retaliatory
act is would at times depend on the circumstances of the employee. For example, ff an employer
transferred
all women who complained
about sexual
harassment at its Bethesda store to a store in Annapolis,
that would be materially (perhaps even materially significantly) adverse for workers who lived in Bethesda, not at
all adverse for a worker who happened to live in Annapolis, and only slightly adverse for a worker who lived in
between the two cities but closer to Bethesda.
That, however, is not the government’s only formulation; indeed, it is not the formulation it proposes to use in
the instant case. Elsewhere in its brief, the United States
proposes that the legality of a retaliatory
act should turn
on whether it constitutes a "significant change" in responsibilities,
working conditions or benefits. (U.S. Br. 21, 27,

8
28). Under this approach, it would not matter how adverse
the impact of that change was, so long as the change itself
was "significant."
Thus if a supermarket retaliated against
a butcher by reassigning her to work as a cashier, there
would be an almost total change in responsibilities,
but
the worker might find that change only slightly (or, perhaps, not at all) disadvantageous.
Application of this
approach would require the courts to develop a system for
rating the significance of changes in responsibilities (e.g.,
how much of the employee’s time was now devoted to
different
tasks, and how different
those tasks were),
working conditions (changes in location, hours, temperature), or benefits (alterations of wages, pension contributions, flex time). The government suggests that this
"significant change in responsibilities" test, not the "materially significant disadvantage" test, should be used here.
(U.S. Br. 27-28). Its proposed analysis turns solely on the
alteration
in White’s work responsibilities,
not on how
adverse those changes were for her.
Third, the government explains that the controlling
question is about the type of harm the employer caused.
Retaliation is materially adverse if it brings about "objectively tangible harm," but not if it causes "[p]urely subjective injuries." (U.S. Br. 23). The meaningof this distinction
(and of this alternative
explanation of "materially adverse") is not entirely clear. The government may intend to
bar only claims based on purely idiosyncratic
employee
preferences,
such as a worker who claims he was retaliated against by being assigned to work in an office painted
yellow, his least favorite color. That would rule out relatively few retaliation
claims. On the other hand, perhaps
the government means that there must be an economic
harm, such as lost wages or medical expenses; that would

9
exclude many of the cases for which Congress amended
Title VII to authorize awards of compensatory damages.
The United States does not ask this Court at this time
to decide among these (or possibly other) glosses on the
exceedingly malleable phrase "materially
adverse." Nor
does the government suggest that the Court itself should
in this case begin to develop the appropriate rating scheme
(e.g., how far away can an employer transfer an employee
without that action causing a "materially
significant
disadvantage" or constituting a "significant
change?") All
this, and perhaps more, is to be left to the lower courts. "In
practice," the government surprisingly assures the Court,
"the results under the various formulations may not vary
greatly"
from the EEOC "reasonably
likely
to deter"
standard. (U.S. Br. 16 n.9).
Three things about the government’s new position
are actually clear. First, that interpretation
would mean
that there would be some forms of retaliation
- serious
enough to deter protected activity - that would be lawful
under section 704(a). (In its briefs in the lower courts,
Department of Justice, as counsel for federal defendants,
has identified a number of retaliatory
practices which the
government suggests are per se lawful). 1° Second, that
interpretation
would impose on the lower courts the
10 Brief of Appellee, McAdamsv. Harvey, No. 04-16263-AA (llth
Cir.), 2005 WL3147709 *5 ("a failure to receive a bonus ... does not
constitute a materially adverse action."); Brief of Appellee, Webster v.
Rumsfeld, No. 04-1739 (4th Cir.), 2005 WL2044700 *24 ("the loss of
bonus is not an adverse employment action where the employee is not
automatically entitled to a bonus."); Brief of Appellee, Smith v. Cohen,
No. 00-10199 (5th Cir.),
2000 WL34214783 *36 (same); Brief
Appellee,
Groves v. Rubin, No. 00-12113GG (llth
Cir.),
2000
34020498 *22 (same).

10
unenviable and potentially endless task of deciding from
among an infinite variety of retaliatory
tactics that are
to be declared permissible under the law. Third, that
interpretation
cannot be reconciled with the language and
purpose of section 704(a).

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the decision of the Sixth Circuit
should be affirmed.
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